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War Crimes -
A Refutation of Objection
By OTTo E. BlEIx *
In the War Crimes Trials in Nuernberg and Tokyo, key military
and civilian officials of our former enemies have been tried for the
crimes they committed during World War II. These trials have be-
come a target for attack from both representatives of the legal pro-
fession and laymen.
Most of the criticism can easily be refuted. Here are some of the
most frequently expressed objections and our answers to them.
Objection No. 1. It is an offense against our concept of justice that
the powerful victor should make himself the judge of nationals of a
defeated and therefore helpless nation.
Answer- One of the most eminent living scholars in International
Law, Lauterpacht, answered this objection in 1944. He declared:
"In the existing state of International Law it is probably unavoid-
able that the right of punishing war criminals should be unilaterally
assumed by the victor. This is so in particular when, as may be the
case at the close of the second World War, the victorious side repre-
sents the overwhelming majority of states and when there are few
neutral states left capable of ensuring the impartial administration of
justice."'
It is clear that anyone brought to trial for a crime is confronted by
a most powerful opponent, the State engaged in the administration
of justice. That is the fateful situation the offender has brought on
himself by his illegal act. This is precisely the reason why states were
created in the first place. Mankind knew that collective power alone
could safeguard its greatest treasurers: Life, Liberty Property It is
power which backs the policeman who arrests, the judge who sen-
tences, and the jailer who imprisons the criminal. It is a truism that
justice cannot be practiced without power.
It is correct to say that power can be either constructive or de-
structive. Power therefore is the source for the creation of order by
0 Doctor of Laws, University of Vienna; member of Vienna, Austria, Bar,
1919-1938. Research Analyst, Office of the Ghief of Military History, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C.
'The British Yearbook of International Law 1944, "The Law of Nations and
International Law" by Professor H. Lauterpacht; p. 59.
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the honest and of disorder by the dishonest. The application of power
to restore order and justice where disorder and injustice were created
by the violators of international peace is a ]ustfled measure.
Objection No. 2. The right of the accused to a fair trial was demed
because of the failure to choose the judges of the court from neutral
countries.
Answer (a) The right to a fair trial was safeguarded because the
judges were impartial jurists of undisputed integrity; the trials were
public, and representatives of the international press were present.
In addition, the accused were entitled to be represented by counsel
of their own choice, and were confronted in open court by the wit-
nesses against them.
(b) The objection is, moreover, invalid because individuals who
have, committed treason or other crimes against their respective coun-
tries have no claim to trial by a neutral power. The administration of
justice within a country would suffer, if such a principle were adopted.
In making the defendants stand trial before a court of the aggrieved
countries the law of the charter followed an almost universal criminal
law If an offender escapes into jurisdiction of an indifferent society,
he is extradited and the fugitive brought back to trial in the territory
interested in his prosecution.
(c) In any event, what neutral powers were available for this
mission? The only nations with legal systems comparable to ours
that did not participate in World War II were Sweden, Switzerland
and Portugal. However, there was a possibility that the so-called
neutral jurists may have been influenced by the strong and well-
financed Axis propaganda which had infiltrated all neutral countries.
Objection No. 8. The war crimes trials have set a precedent for
all future victors to hold political and military leaders responsible for
crimes committed during a war.
Answer- This objection must be admitted as correct. It has been
acknowledged in the text of the last judgment pronounced in Nuern-
berg: "We may not, in justice, apply to these defendants because they
are Germans, standards of duty and responsibility which are not
equally applicable to the officials of the Allied Powers and to those of
all nations "2
There it has been stated clearly that we are prepared to be tried
for any war crimes that we may commit. It is the very term "crimes"
in which our -statesmen and generals may find assurance. In a highly
developed democracy like ours, standards of duty and responsibility
"TAYLOR: NURENBERG TmALs, WAn CRaMES AND INTznNATiONAL LAW
(1949), p. 858, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Law.
WAR CRImES
have been created which rule out crimes of the order of those com-
mitted by the Nazis or Japanese. That has been proven in the last
two world wars. Our concept of right led the court to assume the
defendants innocent unless they were proven guilty and to acquit
such defendants as Schacht and von Papen.
The often heard criticism, that some of the defendants committed
the crimes charged against them under the compulsion of orders from
their military superiors, can best be refuted by quoting Paragraph
7 of the German Military Penal Code:
"If execution of an order given in line of duty violates a statute of
the penal code, the superior giving that order alone is held responsible
for it. The subordinate obeying that order, however, is liable to pun-
ishment as an accessory in the event that he was aware that the
order involved an act the commission of which constituted a common
or military crime or offense."
Wherever there was any doubt in the guilt of officers who were
alleged to have participated in the commitment of a crime, they were
acquitted. For this reason Lt. Gen. Foertsch and Brig. Gen. Geitner
were acquitted of all charges in Case No. 7 (United States v. List et al).
Although they had known of the criminal orders which led to the
atrocities, and indeed had initialled and distributed some of them, the
Tribunal concluded that their lack of "command of authority" and the
"want of direct evidence placing responsibility" upon them required
their acquittal."
Oblection No. 4. It was wrong to admit Soviet Russia as a member
of the War Crimes Trials because she herself was guilty of conspiring
with Germany in the aggression against Poland.
Answer This objection justly points to a mistake which, though
regrettable, is of little significance. It originated in the hopeful belief
that we were entering into a new era with the creation of the United
Nations. To ignore Soviet Russia -as a participant might have en-
dangered the very foundation on which the world was to be built.
Quite aside from these considerations, the most important fact remains
that Russia s vote, which for the most part was that of the majority
had no bearing on the result of the trials.
Oblection No. 5. The London Charter enacted on August 8, 1945,
on which the War Crimes Jurisdiction is based is ex post facto and
violates Article I, Section 9, Point 3 of the American Constitution.
Criticism refers to the following statements by the United States repre-
sentatives in Versailles, Major James Brown Scott and Secretary of
3 Ibzdem, p. 325.
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State Robert Lansing, who said on 29 March 1919 in the Commission
on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement
of Penalties: " The American representatives believe that the Com-
mission has exceeded its mandate m extending liability to violations
of the laws of humanity in as much as the facts to be examined are
solely violations of the laws and customs of war. They also believed
that the Commission erred in seeking to subject heads of state to
trial and punishment by a tribunal to whose jurisdiction they were
not subject when the alleged offenses were committed. A judicial
tribunal deals only with existing law and only administers existing
law They were adverse to the creation of a new tribunal, of a
new law of a new penalty which would be ex post facto in nature and
thus contrary to an express clause of the Constitution of the United
States and in conflict with the law and the practice of civilized na-
tions "4
Answer- The answer was given conclusively by Justice Robert H.
Jackson on 6 June 1945 in his report to the President of the United
States in which he rebuts James Brown Scott and Robert Lansing:
" Nor should such a defense be recognized as the obsolete doctrine
that a head of state is immune from legal responsibility We do
not accept the paradox that legal responsibility should be the least
where power is the greatest. With the doctrine of immunity of
a head of state usually is coupled another, that orders from an official
superior protect one who obeys them. It will be noticed that the
combination of these two doctrines means that nobody is responsible.
Society as modernly organized cannot tolerate so broad an area of
official irresponsibility "5
Here indeed we have arrived at the very central problem of the
entire War Crime issue. Moreover, we have arrived at the judicial
landmark which has ben set by the creation of a new law This law
for the first time introduces the criminal liability of the individual for
wrongful acts committed during the course of a war.
Let us examine the precedents for establishing individual respon-
sibility for war crimes.
Francisco de Vitoria, who is considered the first author who wrote
on international law, said m 1582 that a belligerent is entitled to pun-
ish for war crimes those members of the armed forces of the opponent
who happen to fall into his hands. This principle was frequently
'Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforce-
ment of Penalties. Report of March 29, 1919, pp. 127-151 of the Amer. Journal
of International Law, Vol. 14, 1919.
Report of Robert H. Jackson to the International Conference on Mili-
tary Trials, London 1945. Document VIII, pp. 46-47.
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repeated after that time by Grotius, Christian Wolff, Johann Jacob
Moser, Holland, etc.6
The validity of this custom was reaffirmed as recently as April 25,
1945 when, in a communication from the British Government to the
U. S. President, the following statement was made: "The question
arises whether they (i.e., the major criminals associated with Hitler
and Mussolini) should be tried by some tribunal claiming to exercise
judicial functions, or whether the decision should be reached and
enforced without the machinery of a trial. His Majesty s Govern-
ment wish to put before their principal Allies the reasons
which have led them to think that execution without trial is the pref-
erable course."-
This is a direct continuation of the line of thought of Francisco de
Vitono who asserted that international custom does not subject the
captor nation to any obligation. Its only opponent is the captured
individual without rights who-as a war criminal-lacks all protection
of an international convention.
Thus, the United States would have been fully justified in perpe-
tuating custom and tradition by punishing World War II criminals
without a trial. This however the U S. did not feel justified in doing.
Our attitude on this issue is vividly expressed by the U S. Memoran-
dum reported during the International War Crimes Conferences in
San Francisco on April 30, 1945. "It may be argued that the Nazi
leaders should be dealt with politically rather than judicially and that,
without trial by joint action they should be put to death upon capture.
The U S. is vigorously opposed to such political disposition. The
'Lauterpacht: The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes,
BmTixsH Boox oF INTERNATiONAL LAw, -pp. 61-62. " the practice and the
doctrine of international law as well as the municipal law of a considerable num-
ber of states recognize that a belligerent is entitled to punish for war cnmes those
members of the armed forces of the opponent who fall into his hands. There is
hardly a dissenting voice in the general approval of that rule. Neither is it a new
doctrine in international law. Francisco de Vitona, writing in 1532, stated the
underlying principle Grotious, while pleading for prisoners of war who have
surrendered or desire to do so, says: "in order to warrant their execution it is
necessary that a crime shall have been previously committeed, such a crime, how-
ever, as a just judge would hold punishable by death." Christian Wolff, the Ger-
man philosopher and lawyer, writing in 1764, reproduces, almost literally, the
same view. Johann Jakob Moser, a leading German positivist writer of the same
period, is even more emphatic: "Enemy combtatants who act contrary to inter-
national law need not, when they fall into the hands of the belligerent, be treated
as prisoners of war, but may be treated as robbers, murderers and so on." The
Institute of International Law expressed the same view in 1882. Holland, writing
in 1908, was very definite on the subject "
'Report of Robert H. Jackson to the International Conference on Mili-
tary Trials, London, 1945, Aide-Memoire from the United Kingdom, April 23,
1945, handed over by Sir Alexander Cadogan to Judge Samuel Rosenmann,
Assistant of the President, pp. 18-20, Doc. II.
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satisfaction of instincts of revenge and retribution for the sake of
retribution are obviously the least sound basis of punishment. It
will retard progress towards a new concept of international obligations
simply because those who have sought in this war to preserve demo-
cracy will have made their most spectacular dealing with the van-
quished, a negation of democratic principles of justice. They will
have adopted methods repugnant alike to Anglo-American and Conti-
nental traditions. A political disposition of the Axis leaders would
be a continuation of totalitarian practices I's
Once having committed ourselves on this issue we then proceeded
to draw the consequences by submitting to the victorious powers a
far-reaching innovation which meant the introduction of a new element
into international law
In the final analysis two measures were proposed and subsequently
adopted.
(a) the yielding of unilateral power to self-imposed restrictions
favoring the war criminal,
(b) the initial recognition of aggressive warfare as a war crime
for which the individual was held answerable. In this category also
fell such violations of the laws of humanity which could not be re-
garded as customs of war.
This second measure seems to be a violation of the ex post facto
rule.
But this interpretation is a fallacy because the conditions which
make the ex post facto rule applicable did not exist.
This rule has its origin in the very concept of an orgaized com-
munity which guarantees to its members life, liberty, and property
The creators of the ex post facto rule-which is only a variation of
the continental principle "Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege"-
were Montesquieu, Rousseau, Beccaria, and Fuerbach. 9 These men re-
garded the State as a contract between the community and its indivi-
' Report of Robert H. Jackson to the International Conference on Military
Trial, London 1945, Document V pp. 83-37.
, Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 YALE L. Joun. (1937) 165, 167-169:
those who find the origin of nulla poena, in its present significance, in Magna
Charta are on unsettled territory it is parliamentary influence which in fact
transformed what might only in a very vague style be termed nulla poena into
some real approximation to the rule. For with legislation came gradual subordina-
tion of common law and also, the distinctive techmques of statutory construction
which characterize the continental significance of the rule The English tra-
dition of the rule of law, translated by eightenth century French philosophers
into terms expressive of the Revolutionary idiology joined with the continental
movement for codification to provide nulla poena with its particular, current
meamngs Feuerbach is generally credited with the statement of nulla poena
in its current form .Feuerbach s integration of prevailing political ideology
with the criminal law was simple enough: one who violates the liberty guaranteed
by the social contract and safeguarded by penal laws commits a crime.
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dual members. It is evident that the rule cannot apply to a community
if it does not protect life, liberty and property of its members. If we
apply this principle to the arbitrary actions of war criminals, we would
thereby recognize these acts as being within the law Punishment of
such acts would be impossible because no previously enacted law
exists which would provide for punishment. Application of that prin-
ciple would mean the recognition of arbitrariness in international
relations.
Even the strongest defender of this rule has to admit that his
standpoint contributes to the protection of the wrong-doer instead of
bringing him to justice.' 0
Thus by being loyal to the ex post facto rule he finds himself in
the position of committing the unethical act of defending the wrong
against those to whom wrong had been done.
There is a close similarity between the theory advocated by those
who object to international ex post facto legislation and that pro-
pounded by conscientious objectors. These men refuse to fight for
their country with the argument that the commandment says: "Thou
shalt not kill." They disregard the fact that this law is based on the
premise of peaceful conditions within the community exactly as the
ex post facto rule did at a later time. The advocates of both theories
may be respected or excused because of their conviction but that does
not mean that they are right.
It is the same basic approach which influenced the judgment of
the International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg against Goering
et al., rendered on 1 Oct. 1946, to such an extent that it came to the
fallacious conclusion: "The Charter is the expression of inter-
national law existing at the time of its creation.""
This statement is not correct. The international Military Tribunal
considered itself bound by the Anglo-American constitutional prohibi-
tion forbidding ex post facto legislation as well as by the basic prin-
ciple "Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege." It contested that the
Charter bad created a new international penal code on an ex post
facto basis. But it reached its verdict on the basis of this newly
created law
"0Hans Kelsen: The Rule against Ex Post Facto Laws and the Prosecution of
the Axis War Criminals, Judge Advocate Journal, Vol. II, No. 3, Fall-Winter, 1945,
p. 11. " There can be little doubt that, according to the public opimon of the
civilized world, it is more important to bring the war criminals to justice than to
respect, in their trial, the rule against ex post facto law, wich has merely a rela-
tive value and consequently, was never unrestnctedly recogmzed "
2
t Judgment of the International Military Tribunal of 1 Oct. 1946, page 48 of
the U. S. Government Publication "Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression," U. S. Print-
ing Office, 1947.
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On this issue the United States representatives to the International
Conference on Military Trials, Robert H. Jackson and the Representa-
tive of the United Kingdom, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe showed greater
sincerity In preparing the Charter together with the Representatives
of France and Soviet Russia they admitted frankly that without in-
troduction of the concept of individual responsibility and without
tying the Court, which was to be established thereby to the law of
the Charter, they would not be in a position to indict the guilty and
to bring about their punishment.
We quote verbatim the opinions expressed by Justice Robert H.
Jackson and Sir David Maxwell Fyfe on 28 July 1945:
Sir David Maxwell Fyfe: " there is one fundamental
point I don't want it to be left to the Tribunal to interpret what
are the principles of international law it should apply. It should
not be left to the Tribunal to say what is or what is not a violation
of international law "
Justice Robert H. Jackson: " it is entirely proper that
these four powers, in view of the disputed state of the law of nations,
should settle by agreement what the law is as the basis of this pro-
ceeding; and, if I am wrong about that, I do not see much basis for
putting these people on trial it would be entirely open to the
Tribunal to adjudge that, while these persons had committed
the acts we charge, these acts were not crimes against international
law and therefore to acquit them. We must declare that they
answer personally, and I am frank to say that international law is
indefinite and weak in our support "
Sir David Maxwell Fyfe: " It seems to me that on
that point is really substantial agreement except for the argu-
ment against ex post facto legislation which Professor Gros put for-
ward- (Professor Gros was representative of France.)
Professor Gros: " Those acts have been known for
years before and have not been declared criminal violations of inter-
national law. It is declaring as settled something discussed for
years and settling a question as if we were a codification commis-
sion
Justice Robert H. Jackson: " But we are a codifica-
tion commission for the purpose of this trial as I see it. That is my
commission "12
The subsequent judgment of Military Tribunal III in the Justice
case, rendered on 4 December 1947 has officially rectified the false
statement (in the Verdict of the International Military Tribunal) that
no new legislation had been applied. The following quotation from
the above mentioned judgment is an explicit recognition of the fact
that the ex post facto rule is not applicable within the field of inter-
national law
"Excerpt from document No. XLIV Minutes of Conference Session of 25
July 1945 in the publication "Report of Robert H. Jackson to the Interna-
tional Conference on Military Trials," London, 1945.
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"It would be sheer absurdity to suggest that the ex post
facto rule, as known to constitutional states, could be applied to a
treaty, a custom, or a common law decision of an international tri-
bunal, or to the international acquiescence which follows the event.
To have attempted to apply the ex post facto principle to judicial
decisions of common itnernational law would have been to strangle
that law at birth.""
Previously, on 24 October 1946, the Secretary General of the United
Nations suggested to the General Assembly that the principles estab-
lished at Nuernberg should be made a permanent part of international
law
On 11 December 1946 the General Assembly of the United Nations
unaimously affirmed the principles of international law recognized
by the Charter of the Nuernberg Tribunal and judgment of the Tri-
bunal.
14
We may summarize the new development of international, criminal
law as follows:
(a) On August 8, 1945, an international agreement was made by
the four Great Powers with the adherence of 19 additional nations
which established an International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg
for the purpose of meting out justice to war criminals. In the so-called
London Charter (Annex to this Agreement) they determined the pnn-
ciples of international law to be used by this tribunal.
Among the 23 signatory nations were the three great democracies,
United States, United Kingdom, and France, as well as a number of
the smaller nations which in their domestic codes recognize the valid-
ity of the ex post facto principle.
(b) On October 1, 1946, the judgment of the International Mili-
tary Tribunal was handed down in accordance with the principles of
international criminal law as set forth in the London Charter; these
principles of the Charter and Judgment were .used as precedent in
subsequent War Crimes trials held by the U. S. and by the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo.
(c) On December 11, 1946, the entire membership of the United
Nations affirmed unanimously these principles of international crim-
inal law recognized by the London Charter and by the Judgment of
the International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg.
"Taylor: "NUENBERG TRIALS, WAR CaRiMES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,"
p. 288 (published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New
York, 1949). See also, Jorge Amencano: TnE NEW FOuNDATION OF INTERNA-
TiONAL LAW (Neiv York, 1947), " The rule that there is no crane without a
prior law defining it, and the rule that there is no penalty without prior legal
commination, are not applicable to international law "
" The Charter and Judgment of the Nuernberg Tribunal, United Nationas
Publications No. 7, ex 1949, p. 15.
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The inference drawn from these facts, especially from the decision
of the top-level international body of the United Nations is:
The conscience of mankind rejects the fallacious theory that the
new international legislation provided by the London Charter of
August 8, 1945, has violated the ex post facto rule or any other rule
of ethics and fairness.
This "Affirmation" of the United Nations constitutes a logical end
to any dispute on the justification of the War Crimes legislation and
the trials based on it.
The beneficial effects of the War Crimes program after World
War II have been shown recently in several cases.
For instance, the judgment in the so-called "Hostage Case" (United
States v List and al.), rendered m February 1948, has been much
criticized as unduly lenient because of the Tribunal's ruling which
upheld the right of an occupying power to shoot hostages under cer-
tain circumstances. The Court reluctantly held that the laws of war
do not prohibit the killing of hostages. In so doing, the Tribunal
practically invited a revision of the Hague Conventions which would
expressly forbid the killing of hostages.
The new "Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War" of 12 August 1949 was signed by the United
States and fifty-nine other nations including Soviet Russia. In Article
34 of this convention we find that "the taking of hostages is prohibited."
Had the courts not examined such cruelties of war that were
previously tolerated the civilian population would never have gamed
this vital protection in a future war. In this connection it should be
remembered how much the world was stirred by the killing of inno-
cent hostages during World Wars I and II.
Progressive mankind will always strive to rid itself of evil and in
this struggle it will not be deterred by adverse criticism until it has
achieved its goal.
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